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This paper studies the impact of a regional free trade agreement, MERCOSUR, on technology 
upgrading by Argentinean firms. To  guide empirical work,  I introduce  technology  choice in 
Melitz’s (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms. The joint treatment of the technology 
and exporting choices shows that the increase in revenues produced by trade integration can 
induce exporters to upgrade technology. An empirical test of the model reveals that firms in 
industries facing higher reductions in Brazil’s tariffs increase their investment in technology 
faster. This effect is highest in the upper-middle range of the firm-size distribution, as predicted 
by the model.     
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Trade  liberalization  can  increase  productivity  by  inducing  a  better  allocation  of  production 
factors or the adoption of more advanced technologies. The recent trade literature [Nina Pavcnik 
(2002), Marc Melitz (2003), Andrew B. Bernard et al. (2003) and  James R. Tybout (2003)] has 
emphasized the first channel: trade integration reallocates market shares towards exporters, the 
most productive firms, increasing aggregate productivity. In this paper I show that, in addition, 
the resulting increase in revenues can induce exporters to invest in  new technologies.  
I  study  the  impact  of  a  regional  free  trade  agreement  on  technology  upgrading  by 
Argentinean firms. To guide empirical work, I introduce technology choice in a model of trade 
with heterogeneous firms.  In the model, more productive firms make higher revenues, therefore 
are the only ones that find paying the fixed costs to enter the export market profitable, like in 
Melitz’s (2003). In addition, only the most productive firms adopt the most advanced technology. 
This is because the benefit of adoption is proportional to revenues, while its cost is fixed.  In this 
setup, a bilateral reduction in tariffs increases export revenues more than it decreases domestic 
revenues, inducing more firms to adopt the new technology. 
I test the model in the context of a regional trade liberalization episode: MERCOSUR.  I 
directly estimate the impact of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on entry in the export market and 
technology upgrading by Argentinean firms.  Brazil’s tariffs provide a good source of arguably 
exogenous variation, as they fell from an average of 29% in 1991 to zero in 1995, and varied 
extensibly across industries. Indeed, a look at the aggregate data suggests that MERCOSUR had 
a strong impact on Argentina’s exports: between 1992 and 1996 exports to Brazil quadrupled 
while exports to the rest of the world increased only 60%.    3 
The firm-level panel data set I analyze is uncommon in that it contains direct measures 
of  spending  in  several  dimensions  of  technology,  namely  computers,  software,  technology 
transfers, patents and innovation activities performed within the firm like R&D.
1  This permits 
to build a direct and comprehensive measure of investment in technology instead of relying on 
the estimation of residuals from the production function as proxies for the level of technology.   
In a first analysis of the data I check whether the sorting pattern predicted by the model  
is consistent with the observed  differences between exporters and non exporters operating in the 
same industry. In the model, underlying productivity differences produce a sorting of firms in 
three  groups:  the  most  productive  firms  both  export  and  use  the  advanced  technology,  the 
intermediate group exports but still uses the old technology and the least productive firms use the 
old technology and serve only the domestic market. Indeed, in 1992 exporters had, on average,  a 
higher level of spending in technology per worker than non exporters in the same industry. The 
model also predicts that during the liberalization period both old and new exporters upgrade 
technology  faster  than  non  exporters,  which  is  confirmed  by  the  data.    In  particular,  new 
exporters  were  not  more  technology  intensive  than  non  exporters  before  liberalization,  but 
upgrade technology faster as they enter the export market during the liberalization period. 
The patterns in the data described above show that there is a coincidence between entry 
in the export market and technology upgrading but do not provide an answer to the question of 
whether trade liberalization induced firms to adopt new technologies. Indeed, both entry in the 
export market and technology upgrading could be caused by other economic reforms undertaken 
                                                 
1 In addition, the survey contains a series of questions asking whether the firm performed a certain category of 
innovation or improvement in products or production process during the period 1992-1996 that I use to perform 
robustness checks.  
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in the same period if these had heterogeneous effects on firms with different characteristics.
2 
Then, a second step in the empirical analysis attempts to establish causality by linking exporting 
and technology adoption directly to the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs for imports from Argentina.  
Note that this is a direct test of the model where both the decision to enter the export market and 
to adopt a new technology are endogenous, and thus a function of tariffs.  
The model predicts that in industries where tariffs fall more, both the productivity cutoff 
to enter the export market and to adopt the new technology fall more. Then, to asses the impact 
of falling tariffs on the export decision I estimate the change in the probability that a firm enters 
the export market as a function of the change in Brazil’s tariffs at the industry level. I find that 
firms in sectors with a higher reduction in tariffs are more likely to enter the export market. The 
average reduction in tariffs (24 percentage points) increases the probability to enter the export 
market by 10 to 12 percentage points.  
Next, to asses the impact of falling tariffs on the technology adoption decision I estimate 
the change in spending in technology
3 as a function of the change in tariffs. I find that firms 
increase their spending in technology faster in industries where tariffs fall more. The average 
reduction in Brazil’s tariffs increases spending in technology by 0.20 to 0.28 log points. I find 
that the reduction in tariffs has a positive effect of similar magnitude on old and new exporters, 
as suggested by the within industry patterns in the data reported above.  
Finally, I test the model’s prediction that that the reduction in  tariffs induces firms in the 
middle range of the productivity distribution to enter the export market and upgrade technology, 
but should not affect firms in the lower and upper ranges of the distribution. I find that the 
                                                 
2 For example, capital account liberalization could have made credit available for middle sized firms allowing them 
to enter the export market and upgrade technology. 
3 As  measures  technology  I  use  spending  in  technology,  spending  in  technology  per  worker  and  spending  in 
technology over sales, all produce similar results.    5 
reduction  in  Brazil’s  tariffs  had  a  stronger  effect  on  both  entry  in  the  export  market  and 
technology upgrading in the 3
rd
 quartile of the firm size distribution.
4 The estimated effects on 
the 3
rd quartile are around double the size than the average effects for all firms reported above.  
The empirical identification of the effect of falling export costs on entry in the export 
market and technology upgrading is based on a generalized differences-in-differences estimation, 
where the sources of variation are the changes in Brazil’s tariffs for imports from Argentina 
across  time  (1996  -  1992)  and  across  4-digit-SIC  industries.    Note  that,  as  MERCOSUR 
mandates that tariffs fall to zero in all industries, I relate changes in technology spending to the 
initial level of Brazil’s tariffs.  The focus on changes in technology differences out time-invariant 
industry characteristics that might be correlated with Brazil’s tariffs.  The use of the initial level 
of Brazil’s tariffs minimizes reverse causality concerns. Still, a main potential problem is that 
other reforms carried out in the same period could have had heterogeneous effects on industries 
with  different  characteristics.
5 I  address  this  concern  by  showing  that  results  are  robust  to 
controls for industry trends at the 2-digit-SIC dissagregation level and the likely determinants of 
Brazilian trade policy: skill, capital intensity and the elasticity of demand of the industry at the 4-
digit-SIC dissagregation level.  
The model developed in this paper builds on an extensive theoretical literature analyzing 
the effects of trade on technological change.
6 In particular, it was inspired by the insight that a 
                                                 
4 I  use  initial  firm  size  measured  as  employment  relative  to  the  4-digit-industry  mean  in  1992  as  a  proxy  for 
productivity, as the survey does not provide for measures of value added nor a long enough series of investment that 
would permit to calculate productivity as a residual of an estimated production function.   
5 For example, capital account liberalization could have benefited capital-intensive industries disproportionately.  If 
Brazil’s trade policy was also targeting these industry characteristics, the estimates of the effects of tariffs might 
pick up the impact of this other policy. 
6 Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991)  provide  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  effects  of  economic  integration  on 
innovation and growth;  Eaton and Kortum (2001) discuss the effect of lower barriers to trade on innovation, in 
particular, in their baseline model the effect of a bigger market size is counteracted by the increased competition 
with technologies embedded in imports, so that there is no effect of lower barriers to trade on innovation.  
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reduction  in  trade  costs  increases  the  share  of  firms  that  export  and  use  the  most  advanced 
technology in Stephen R. Yeaple (2005).  The model I present differs from Yeaple’s in that 
heterogeneity  in  exporting  and  technology  choice  is  the  result  of  ex-ante  heterogeneity  in 
productivity.
7 To my knowledge, the model presented in this paper is the first to show that when 
firms are heterogeneous the presence of fixed technology adoption costs implies that the trade-
induced reallocations of market shares towards exporters can induce them to upgrade technology.  
This differential feature of the model is important to interpret the empirical findings reported 
above: the reduction in tariffs induced technology adoption mostly the 3
rd quartile of the firm 
size distribution, and not only new exporters but also firms that were already exporting upgrade 
technology when variable trade costs fall.  
The empirical work presented in this paper is related to the literature that analyzes the 
question of whether export market participation has a positive impact on productivity. The first 
studies by Sofronis K. Clerides, Saul Lach and James Tybout  (1998) for Colombia, Mexico and 
Morocco;  and  Bernard  and  Jensen  (1999)  for  the  U.S.  find  that  exporters  have  higher 
productivity  than  non  exporters,  but  this  is  because  ex-ante  more  productive  firms  become 
exporters, while there are no effects of exporting on productivity. Instead, recent papers in this 
literature like Johannes Van Biesebroeck (2005) and Jan De Loecker (2007) find increases in 
productivity after firms enter the export market in Ivory Coast and Slovenia, respectively.  This 
paper  differs  from  this  literature  in  that  the  outcome  of  interest  is  technology  instead  of 
productivity;  and  in  that  it  analyzes  the  effect  of  bilateral  trade  liberalization  on  technology 
adoption, not the effect of exporting. 
                                                 
7 In Yeaple (2005) firms are ex-ante homogeneous, but in equilibrium all firms are indifferent between entering the 
export market and adopting the new technology or serving only the domestic market and using the old technology.  
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The  first  departure  from  previous  literature,  namely  the  focus  on  investment  in 
technology as the outcome of interest, has the advantage of isolating a particular mechanism 
through which firm-productivity can improve.
8  Earlier studies have often estimated productivity 
as a residual in the production function. These residuals not only capture differences in technical 
efficiency  across  firms  but  also  differences  in  market  power,    factor  market  distortions,  or 
changes in the product mix, as suggested by the recent work by Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger, 
and Chad Syverson (2008), Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow (forthcoming) and Andrew B. 
Bernard,  Stephen  Redding  and  Peter  Schott  (forthcoming),  respectively.  More  importantly, 
changes in technology not only affect productivity but can have implications for factor markets if 
new technologies use skilled labor more intensively.  Indeed, several studies have documented 
increases in the relative demand for skill in developing countries during the trade liberalization 
period,
9 leaving the open question of whether  skill-biased technological change might have been 
an endogenous response to trade liberalization.  This paper provides evidence for a particular 
channel  through  which  increased  trade  can  induce  firms  to  upgrade  technology,  namely 
increased export revenues.   
The second departure from existing literature, namely the estimation of the impact of a 
reduction in a trading partner’s tariffs on investment in technology instead of the effect of export 
market  participation,  parallels  the  comparative  static  exercise  that  naturally  emerges  from  a 
                                                 
8 A similar approach was followed by Eric Verhoogen (2008) who develops a model where increased trade with 
more developed countries increases production of high quality goods and tests it in the context of Mexico’s 1994 
devaluation. The mechanism generating quality upgrading in his model is the higher valuation for high quality goods 
of consumers in developed countries, the U.S. in this case. Instead, in this paper the analysis focuses on trade 
liberalization between two countries of a similar level of development, Argentina and Brazil, thus the mechanism 
generating technology upgrading is of a different nature: increased revenues for exporters to a country with identical 
homothetic  preferences.    Still,  in  the  model  technology  upgrading  can  be  interpreted  alternatively  as  reducing 
marginal production costs or increasing quality.   
 
9 Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik (2007) review and discuss these studies. 
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model  where  both  the  decision  to  export  and  adopt  technology  are  endogenous,  thus  each 
variable is a direct function of tariffs. This exercise is aimed to address the policy question of 
what is the effect of a reduction in a trading partner’s tariffs on technology investment, for which 
comparison of exporters and non exporters across time can only offer indirect evidence.  Indeed, 
the finding that entry in the export market is not associated with increases in productivity in the 
absence of trade reforms can be explained by entry responding to temporary opportunities to sell 
in a foreign market.  The opposite finding, even in the context of a trade reform, can’t be fully 
attributed  to  it,    specially  in  the  context  of  simultaneous  implementation  of    other  market-
oriented  reforms  that  might  have  made  it  possible  for  some  firms  to  invest  in  productivity 
improvements  and  thus enter the export market.  
The empirical methodology implemented in this paper follows the literature measuring 
the effects of trade liberalization on economic outcomes through changes in tariffs.
10 The focus 
of most studies has been unilateral trade liberalizations while the analysis of regional or bilateral 
trade liberalizations are rare. The first study of the impact of a trading partner’s reduction in 
tariffs using plant-level data was Daniel Trefler’s (2004) analysis of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement. To my knowledge, this paper’s analysis of MERCOSUR is the first study of the 
impact of a trading partner’s reduction in tariffs for a developing country. Not surprisingly, the 
effects of trade on technology adoption seem to be different in this context. This can be seen by 
comparing the results presented here with those in a contemporaneous study of the Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement by Alla Lileeva and Daniel Trefler (forthcoming). Their finding that the 
reduction in U.S. tariffs only induced productivity increases in the least productive new entrants 
                                                 
10  This literature includes studies of the impact of trade liberalization on inequality like Orazio Attanasio, Pinelopi 
K. Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik (2004) for Colombia, Petia Topalova (2005) for India,  and the study of the impact of 
trade liberalization on productivity in Colombia by Ana Fernandes (2007).   
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in the export market for the case of Canada contrasts with the findings for Argentina where the 
reduction in Brazil’s tariffs induced technology upgrading mostly in the 3
rd quartile of the firm-
size distribution and not only in new but also in old exporters. As I discuss in the theoretical 
section of the paper, the result that old exporters upgrade technology when trade costs fall only 
obtains when the costs of technology adoption are high (relative to fixed exporting costs) which 
is more likely to be the case in developing countries. 
The  remaining  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents  the 
theoretical model and derives the empirical predictions on the effects of trade liberalization on 
entry in the export market and technology upgrading.  Section II describes the trade liberalization 
episode and the data set. Section III presents the empirical strategy and tests the predictions of 
the model. Section IV concludes.   
 
I. Theory 
This section develops a simple model of the decision to enter the export market and upgrade 
technology by heterogeneous firms. I consider the case of two symmetric countries engaging in 
bilateral trade liberalization. Each economy consists of a single monopolistically competitive 
industry where firms produce differentiated products under increasing returns to scale, and using 
a single factor of production, labor, as in Paul Krugman (1979). Firms are heterogeneous in 
productivity, face fixed exporting costs as in Melitz (2003), and can choose to increase their 
productivity by paying a fixed technology adoption cost, as in Yeaple (2005).  
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A.  Set up of the Model 
Each country is endowed with L units of labor used to produce differentiated products in a single 
industry.  The  symmetry  assumption  ensures  that  wages,  which  are  the  numeraire,    and  all 
aggregate variables are the same for both countries. I present the discussion from the point of 
view of the home country.  
Entry 
The supply side is characterized by monopolistic competition. Each variety is produced by a 
single firm, and there is free entry into the industry. Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity 
in  the  sense  that  marginal  labor  costs  vary  across  firms  using  the  same  technology.
11 This 
idiosyncratic  component  of  labor  productivity  is  indexed  by j ,  that  also  indexes  firms  and 
varieties. To enter the industry in a given country, firms pay a fixed entry cost consisting of   e f   
units of labor. Entrants then draw their productivity from a known Pareto cumulative distribution 
function 
k G
- - = j j 1 ) (  with k >  1.  
Technology  
After observing their productivity firms decide whether to exit the market or stay and produce. 
Firms produce varieties using a technology that features a constant marginal cost ( j / 1 ) and a 
fixed cost ( f ), both in terms of labor. Firms can choose to upgrade their technology in the 
following  sense:  by  paying  an  additional  fixed  cost  they  can  reduce  their  marginal  cost  of 
production. This can be represented as a choice between two different technologies l and h, 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, heterogeneity in productivity can be interpreted as quality: more productive firms produce a good of 
higher quality, in the sense that consumers are willing to pay more for the same amount of the good.  
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where h features a higher fixed cost ( η f ) and a lower marginal cost [ ) /( 1 gj ]. The resulting total 



























                                                                                                            
where η >1 and  γ >1.  Then, in this setup, there is a part of firm productivity that is the result of 
luck but firms can also take actions to increase their productivity.  A simple interpretation would 
be that before entering an industry firms engage in product development, but the value of that 
product/its marginal production cost is revealed only after it has been developed and thus the 
cost of product development is sunk. At the production stage, firms can take actions to increase 
the quality of the product or further reduce its marginal cost, by paying a higher fixed production 
cost every period.  Finally, in every period there is an exogenous probability of exit ) (d .  
Serving the Foreign Market 
After entry, a firm can choose to export, in which case it must incur an additional fixed cost fx. In 
addition, exported goods are subject to per-unit iceberg trade costs, so thatt units need to be 
shipped for 1 unit to make it to the foreign country.  
Demand 
Preferences  across  varieties  have  the  standard  CES  form,  with  an  elasticity  of  substitution 
1 ) 1 /( 1 > - = r s .  These  preferences  generate  a  demand  function  [ ]
s s w w
- - = ) ( ) (
1 p EP q for 













1 ) ( d p P
M
is the price 
index of the industry, M is the number (measure) of existing varieties and E is the aggregate level 
of spending in the country.          12 
 
B.  Firm Behavior 
Profit Maximization 
Under CES preferences the profit maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal costs.  
Then, a firm with productivity j  using technology l charges the price  ) /( 1 ) ( rj j =
d
l p  in the 
domestic market and a higher price in the export market  ) /( ) ( rj t j =
x
l p .  If instead the firm 
uses  technology  h,  it  charges  lower  prices  in  both  markets:  ) /( 1 ) ( rjg j =
d
h p  and 
) /( ) ( rjg t j =
x
h p .  
To make the joint decision of whether to enter the export market and whether to adopt 
technology h, firms compare the total profit of each of the four possible choices, which are 
described below.  
Profits if only serving the domestic market and using technology l: 
( ) f P E
d
l - =
- - 1 1 1
) (
s s j r
s
j p                                                         
 Profits if only serving the domestic market and using technology h: 
( ) h g j r
s
j p
s s s f P E
d
h - =
- - - 1 1 1 1
) (                                                   
 Profits if also exporting and using technology l: 
( ) ( ) x
x
l f f P E - - + =
- - - 1 1 1 1
1 ) (
s s s j r
s
t j p                                     
 Profits if also exporting and using technology h: 
( ) ( ) x
x
h f f P E - - + =
- - - - h g j r
s
t j p
s s s s 1 1 1 1 1
1 ) (                             13 
Note that the assumption that both countries are identical and trade costs are symmetric 
implies that the price index ( ) P  and the  expenditure level ( ) E  in foreign are the same  as at 
home. Exporting and technology choices are represented in Figure 1, where the four possible 
profits are depicted as a function of firm's productivity.
12  The equilibrium depicted is obtained 
when    <
x j
h j ,  where 
x j  is  defined  as  the  level  of  productivity  above  which  a  firm  using 




l j p j p = ] and 
h j is defined as  the level of 
productivity  above  which  an  exporter  finds  adoption  of  technology  h  profitable 




h j p j p = ].  In Appendix A I show that in this equilibrium firms sort into four different 
groups: the least productive firms ( )
* <j j  exit, the low productivity firms ( )
x j j j < <
*  only 
serve the domestic market and use technology l, the medium productivity firms ( )
h x j j j < <  
still use technology l but also export, and the most productive firms ( ) j j <
h  both export and 
use technology h.  
Note that in Figure 1 using technologyhand only serving the domestic market is always 
dominated by some other choice.  Note also that there is a range of productivity levels where 
exporting  is  profitable  but  adopting  technology  h  is  not,  so  that  the  marginal  exporter  uses 
technology l.  I focus in this case ( )
h x j j <  in what follows and provide the necessary parameter 
restrictions for this ordering of cutoffs to apply.  The opposite case ( )
h x j j >  is one where the 
equilibrium  features  no  exporters  using  the  low  technology,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the 
empirical findings I report in the next section.   
 
 
                                                 
12 More precisely a transformation of firm's productivity:
1 - s j .     14 
Figure 1 
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To solve for the industry equilibrium it is useful to state the conditions for exit, entry in 
the export market and technology adoption as a function of the exit cutoff, which I do next. 
Exit 
For the least productive firms profits are highest when using technology l and only serving the 
domestic market. Then the exit cutoff 
* j  is defined by:  
(1)                         ( ) ( ) 0
1
0 ) (
1 1 = - Û =
- * - * f P E
d
l
s s j r
s
j p                                                                        
Exporting 
The marginal exporter uses technology l. Then
x j can be expressed as a function of  
* j  using 




l j p j p =  and the zero profit condition for the marginal firm (eq. 1):    15 
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- s t f fx  ,  
* >j j
x . Thus, only the most productive firms export.         
Technology Choice 
The  marginal  firm  adopting  technology  h  is  an  exporter.  Then  the  adoption  cutoff  ) (
h j  is 
defined by: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 1 0 ) ( ) (
1 1 1 1 - = + - Û = -
- - - - h j r
s
t g j p j p




h                                   
The benefit of using technology h (the L.H.S. of the equation above)  is that the firm makes 
higher revenues, as demand is elastic (σ > 1). The cost of using technology h (the R.H.S. of the 
equation above) is its higher fixed cost.  Note that this cost is the same for all firms while the 
benefit is increasing in productivity. This is why technology choice is characterized by a cutoff 
productivity level 
h j  above which all firms use technology h. Next, 
h j  can be expressed as a 
function  of 
* j  by  substituting  the  zero  profit  condition  for  the  marginal  firm  (eq.  1)  in  the 
equation above: 



























h   
Note that the share of active firms adopting technology h [
k h - *) / ( j j ] is higher the lower are 
variable trade costs. This is because a reduction in trade costs increases the total revenues of 
exporters relative to those of the marginal firm which only serves the domestic market.
13    By 
                                                 
13 Indeed,  in  Appendix  C  I  show  that  this  result  requires  that  the  marginal  firm  is  a  non-exporter,  that  is  




- s t f fx . This is implicitly assumed in the zero profit condition for the marginal firm  (eq. 1) used to derive 
equation (3).    16 
comparing equations (2) and (3) we can see that the parameter restriction required for  
x h j j >  is 
that technology adoption costs are high enough relative to fixed exporting costs: 
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C.  Industry Equilibrium 
The  equilibrium  price  (P),  number  of  firms  (M)  and  the  distribution  of  active  firms' 
productivities in the economy are determined by the free entry condition. Free entry requires that 
the sunk entry cost equals the present value of expected profits: 
(4)              
_ 1
)] ( 1 [ p
d
j
* - = G fe   
where  ) ( 1
* - j G  is  the  probability  of  survival  and 
_
p    are  per-period  expected  profits  of 
surviving  firms.  x x d p
_ _ _
p p p + =  where  d
_
p  are  expected  profits  from  domestic  sales,  
)] ( 1 /[ )] ( 1 [
* - - = j j G G p
x
x   is the probability of exporting conditional on surviving and  x
_
p  are 
expected exporting profits.  Then, to solve for the free entry condition (eq. 4) we need to solve 
for expected profits 
_
p . The derivations are detailed in Appendix A:  
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By substituting the solution for expected profits (eq. 5)
 14 in the free entry condition (eq. 
4) we can solve for the exit cutoff: 


























j                                                                                               
By substituting the solution for the exit cutoff (eq. 6) in eqs. 2 and 3 a solution for the 
exporting and technology adoption cutoffs can be obtained: 






























































































Finally, welfare is determined by the inverse of the price index, which can be obtained by 
substituting the exit cutoff (eq. 6) in the zero-profit condition for the marginal firm (eq. 1): 













































To interpret the solution for expected profits in eq. 5 note that   D f   can be written as: 
( ) f f p f p f f h h x x - + + = D                                                                 
where  ( )
k x
x p
- * = j j /  and  ( )
k h
h p
- * = j j / are  the  fraction  of  surviving  firms  that  export  and 
adopt  the  high  technology,  respectively.  Then,  expected  profits  are  proportional  to  expected 
fixed costs  ( ) D f .  It is straightforward  to show that in the simple case of a closed economy with 
only one technology the solution for expected profits is the same as in eq. 5 but with  1 = D . 
Then, expected profits are proportional to the variable profits of the marginal surviving firm, 
                                                 
14 Note that for expected profits to be positive we need to impose the parameter restriction: k > σ – 1.    18 
which must be equal to f. In the open economy, with probability px the firm becomes an exporter, 
and in that case expected profits are augmented in proportion to x f , the variable exporting profits 
of the marginal exporter. Finally, with probability ph  the firm adopts the high technology, in 
which case expected profits are augmented in proportion to the variable adoption profits of the 
marginal adopters which are  ( ) f fh - .  Note that as a reduction in variable trade costs increases  
the fraction of firms that export px and the fraction of firms adopting the high technology ph, 
expected profits increase.  
 
D.  Bilateral Trade Liberalization 
In this section I analyze the impact of bilateral trade liberalization on entry in the export market 
and  technology  upgrading.  I  show  that  a  reduction  in  trade  costs  increases  export  revenues, 
inducing more firms to enter the export market and upgrade technology. This increases expected 
profits, inducing more entry into the industry. Increased entry reduces the price index and thus 
firms only serving the domestic market loose revenues. As a result, the least productive firms 
make negative profits and exit.  
More formally, I show in Appendix B that when variable trade costs (τ) fall, and not all 
firms export ( f fx >
-1 s t ): 
1.  The fraction of surviving firms that export,  ( )
k x
x p
- * = j j / , and the fraction of  surviving 
of firms that use technology h,  ( )
k h
h p
- * = j j / , increase.
 15  
2.  Expected profits increase, that is   0 /
_
< ¶ ¶ t p .  
3.  The price index falls, that is   0 / > ¶ ¶ t P .  
                                                 
15 This can be directly seen in eqs. 2 and 3.   19 
4.  The exit productivity cutoff increases, that is  0 /
* < ¶ ¶ t j .  
5.  The productivity cutoff for exporting decreases, that is  0 / > ¶ ¶ t jx .   
6.  The productivity cutoff for adopting technology h decreases, that is  0 / > ¶ ¶ t jh .  
Discussion  
The new result in the model is that the reduction in variable trade costs induces more firms to  
upgrade technology (Result 6). What makes adoption of the new technology profitable for the 
most productive exporters is the increase in total revenues.
16 Still, it is important to note that this 
is not a market size effect: an increase in market size as represented by an increase in L does not 
affect revenues nor the technology adoption cutoff. Instead, the result is due to the asymmetric 
effect of trade liberalization in models of heterogeneous firms with fixed exporting costs: while 
firms serving only the domestic market loose revenues, exporters see their revenues increase.    
Indeed, this result requires that domestic revenues fall less than export revenues increase. 
I show in Appendix C that this can never be the case when the marginal firm is an exporter. In 
that case, as τ falls free entry induces the price index to fall enough to make the profits of the 
marginal firm equal to zero. If this firm is an exporter, the price index must fall enough to make 
the reduction in domestic profits completely offset the increase in export profits.    
An  alternative  intuition  for  this  result  is  that  as  countries  engage  in  bilateral  trade 
liberalization, firms loose domestic revenues because there are more foreign firms and increased 
foreign sales, but gain export revenues. The second effect dominates as long as exporters can 
serve the foreign market but face the entry of only a fraction of foreign firms.   
 
 
                                                 
16 The benefit of technology adoption is proportional to revenues while its cost is fixed.    20 
II. Context and Data  
A. Trade Liberalization 
In this section I describe the regional and unilateral trade liberalization policies undertaken in 
Argentina at the beginning of the 1990’s. Although these policies had started to be discussed in 
the late 1980’s, the depth and pace of the reforms implemented in 1991 were largely unexpected. 
The  newly  elected  president  had  promised  populist  policies  during  the  campaign,  namely  a 
widespread increase in wages, but his government implemented a set of market oriented reforms. 
Many observers believed that the newly built consensus for the reforms was mostly due to the 
1989  and  1990  hyperinflations,  and  the  crisis  in  the  socialist  bloc.    In  particular,  political 
arguments favoring MERCOSUR in Argentina and Brazil were based in the view that after the 
fall in the Berlin Wall the world would be organized in regional blocks, as the recent emergence 
of  NAFTA and creation of the EU suggested.
17 
Argentina  started  reducing  import  tariffs  with  respect  to  the  rest  of  the  world  before 
MERCOSUR was launched, in the context of debt-related negotiations with the World Bank and 
the IMF. Between October 1988 and October 1991 there were 11 major revisions of trade policy, 
often  related  to  changes  in  macroeconomic  policy  aimed  at  controlling  hyperinflation.    By 
October 1991, the average nominal tariff was 12%, ranging from 0% to 35%, where rates were 
increasing in the value-added of production of each good.  Manufactures were concentrated in 
the range of 5% to 22%. Almost all import licenses were eliminated, with the exception of the 
automobile industry. Finally, in October 1993 imports of new capital goods were exempted of 
tariffs.  
                                                 
17 For a discussion of the policy debates in Argentina and Brazil during the period of launching of MERCOSUR see 
Jorge Campbell, Ricardo Rozemberg and Gustavo Svarzman (1999).    21 
MERCOSUR  was  established  by  Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay  and  Uruguay  in  March 
1991. The agreement established  generalized, linear and automatic reductions in  tariffs, and the 
adoption of a common tariff with third countries. The tariff reductions were generalized in the 
sense that the same reduction relative to the most-favored nation (m.f.n.) tariff rates was to be 
applied  to  all  goods.    They  were  to  be  implemented  gradually  according  to  a  semi-annual 
timetable starting by a 54% reduction in December 1991,  and finishing at 100% in December 
1994.
18 This new agreement was in sharp contrast with the regional integration treaty signed in 
1988, where reductions in tariffs were gradually negotiated sector by sector and free trade was to 
be achieved in 10 years.  
The Customs Union was established in 1995 with the adoption of a Common External 
Tariff (CET), with an average level of 12%. Tariffs varied between 0 and 20% across industries.   
Inputs and materials had the lowest tariffs, followed by semi-finished industrial goods, capital 
and  IT  goods,
19 and  final  goods.  There  were  exceptions  to  internal  free  trade  for  a  limited 
number of products, special regimes for sugar and automobiles and some products faced tariff 
rates different from the CET.   
MERCOSUR seems to have had a big impact on Argentinean exports. Between 1992 and 
1996, exports to Brazil quadrupled, while exports to the rest of the world only increased 60%.   
As a result, growth in exports to Brazil explains 50% of the growth in total exports during this 
period. This might be related to deep reduction in Brazil’s tariffs in this period. Table 1 reports 
summary statistics for m.f.n tariffs at the 4-digit-SIC industry level of aggregation in the period 
                                                 
18 The timetable of reductions relative to m.f.n. rates was: 54% by December 1991, 61% by June 1992, 68% by 
December  1992,  75%  by  December  1993,  82%  by  December  1993,  89%  by  June  2004  and  finally  100%  by 
December 1994.  
19 According to Julio Berlinski et al. (2006) the common external tariffs for capital  goods (14%) and information 
technology and telecommunication (16%) were the most difficult to agree upon. Argentina favored low tariffs while 
Brazil wanted higher protection. Thus, national tariffs were to converge to the CET by 2001 for capital goods and 
2006 for IT goods, from above in the case of Brazil and from below in the case of Argentina.    22 
under study.
20 The first row reports the level of Brazil’s m.f.n. tariffs in 1991 which are the 
baseline for the MERCOSUR tariff reductions that started in December 1991.  The average 
reduction in Brazil’s tariffs faced by Argentinean firms between December 1991 and December 
1994 was 29 p.p.  Tariff reductions varied extensibly across industries,  as initial m.f.n tariffs 
varied between 84 p.p. and 0 p.p..  As the panel of firms I analyze covers the period 1992-1996, I 
use  the  level  of  Brazil’s  m.f.n  tariffs  in  1992  as  the  baseline  for  the  calculation  of  tariff 
reductions in the period 1992-1996. These are on average 24 p.p,  slightly lower than 1991 tariffs 
but reflect a similar variation across industries, as their correlation is 0.97.  
  As m.f.n. tariffs in Argentina were already low before MERCOSUR was launched, the 
baseline for the reduction in Argentina’s tariffs for imports from Brazil was only 13 percentage 
points on average (Table 1). Still, there was significant variation in tariffs across 4-digit-SIC 
industries, from 0 to 22 p.p.  Surprisingly,  imports from Brazil grew exactly at the same rate as 
imports from the rest of the world during this period (60%).    
As  Argentina’s  unilateral  trade  liberalization  occurred  before  the  period  under  study, 
between 1992 and 1996 Argentina’s average  import tariffs with respect to the rest of the world 
increased slightly (1 p.p.). Still, there were changes in tariffs in both directions, from -10 p.p. to 
15 pp. across 4-digit-SIC industries. The modifications on import tariffs during this period are 
partly related to the convergence to the CET, that partly reflected the structure of protection in 
Brazil.
21 
                                                 
 
20 The  source  of  the  tariff  data  is  UNCTAD-TRAINS.  Tariffs  for  each  4-digit-SIC-industry  are  obtained  as  a 
weighted  average  of  the  9-digit-HS-products  within  each  4-digit-SIC-industry,  where  the  weights  are  given  by 
imports of each product. Thus, when computing Brazil’s m.f.n tariffs in 1992 weights for each product within a 4-
digit industry are based on Argentina’s exports to Brazil of that product in each year. An alternative is to obtain 4-
digit-SIC-industry as simple averages of m.f.n tariffs for 9-digit-HS-products within each industry, but these give 
similar results as their correlation is 0.975. 
21 Berlinsky  et  al.  (2006)  and  Won  Chang  and  L.  Alan  Winters  (2002)  provide  a  more  detailed  discussion  of 
Argentina and Brazil’s trade policy measures in the 1990’s.    23 
In addition,  Table 1 reports average m.f.n. input tariffs for Argentina as these are used 
for robustness checks in the empirical analysis of the impact of  Brazil’s tariffs on entry in the 
export  market  and  technology  upgrading.  The  input  tariff  for  each  industry  is  computed  as 
weighted average of the tariffs of all inputs used, where the weights are based on the cost share 
of each input obtained from the input-output matrix of Argentina, as described in Appendix D. 
The baseline m.f.n rates for Argentina’s input tariff reductions w.r.t Brazil were smaller than the 
output tariffs reported above, with an average level of 11 p.p. in 1992. Similarly, the changes in 
Argentina’s input tariffs w.r.t. the world were smaller than the output tariffs, ranging from -3 to 6 
p.p. 
Finally,  an  important  point  to  note  is  that  the  start  of  MERCOSUR  tariff  reductions 
respect to m.f.n. rates, December 1991,  just precedes the period under study 1992-1996. Still, 
exports seem to have reacted to tariff declines with a lag. The data on aggregate Argentinean 
industrial exports to Brazil shows that these started growing in 1993.  Thus, it is likely that the 
relevant overall tariff reductions in the period 1992-1996 are the full 100% reduction over m.f.n. 
rates between December 1991 and 1994 and not the 32% remaining reduction that occurred 
between December 1992 and 1994. Thus, in the empirical analysis I set the change in Brazil’s 
tariffs w.r.t Argentina between 1992 and 1996 to minus the level of Brazil’s m.f.n tariffs in 1992. 
Similarly, I set the change in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t Brazil between 1992 and 1996 to minus the 
level of Argentina’s m.f.n tariffs in 1992.  Note that the application of a 100% or 32% tariff 
reduction w.r.t. m.f.n tariffs in 1992 does not affect the estimation of the average impact of 
tariffs on entry in the export market or technology upgrading as in the first case the estimated   24 
coefficient is 0.32 times smaller but the average change in tariffs is (1/0.32) times bigger.
22 It 
does affect the interpretation of the results, though, as the implied responses of entry in the 
export market and  spending in technology to a given tariff change are 0.32 times smaller when 
considering the full 100% reduction.  Then, the reported estimates can be considered as a lower 
bound.  
Brazil’s Trade Policy  
As the source of identification of the effect of tariff reductions on entry in the export market and 
technology upgrading are the differences across industries in the level of m.f.n tariffs in Brazil in 
1992, it is important to discuss Brazil’s trade policy in more detail.  
Like Argentina, Brazil implemented a program of unilateral trade liberalization between 
1988 and 1994. Julio Berlinski et al. (2006) note that the tariff structure in 1988 was based on the 
tariffs  implemented  in  1957  under  the  import  substitution  policy.    They  argue  that  the  first 
reforms implemented in 1988-89 did not have significant effects on the degree of protection of 
the domestic industry as NTBs, which were the main instrument of protection, were not modified. 
Instead, after a new government took power in march 1990 NTBs were eliminated and tariffs 
were reduced gradually according to a timetable ending in January 1994. The new tariffs would 
vary between 0 and 20%, except for a few goods facing 30-35% tariff rates.
23   
 Brazil’s m.f.n tariff rates in 1992 reflect a transition between the old and new tariff 
structure. As a result, they display tariff rates above 30 p.p. for some unskilled, labor-intensive 
industries protected under the import substitution policy like toys, textiles and rubber and also 
                                                 
22 For example, if the change in Brazil’s tariffs is set to minus the level of m.f.n tariffs in 1992 multiplied by 0.32, 
estimated coefficients are 1/0.32 times bigger but then the average reduction in Brazil’s tariffs in the period is 0.32 
times smaller, thus the estimated effect of the average reduction of tariffs is the same.  
23 According to Berlinski et al. (2006) the 0% tariffs corresponded to commodities and “exportables”, 10% for 
agricultural products and their derivates,  10,15 and 20% for products using basic inputs with 0% tariffs and  20% 
for the rest of the products. The main exceptions to the general rule were IT goods with a 35% tariff, domestic 
appliances (30%) and the car industry (35% tariff).    25 
for skill-intensive industries that were protected under the new policy like domestic appliances, 
office  accounting  and  computing  and  the  car  industry.  Possibly  as  a  result,  the  correlation 
between Brazil’s tariffs in 1992 and an exogenous measure of skill intensity of the industry
24 is 
very low (-0.002). Instead, tariffs are negatively correlated with a measure of capital intensity (-
0.21), suggesting that Brazil protected labor-intensive industries. As the omission of industry 
characteristics that are correlated with Brazil’s trade policy might induce biases in the estimation 
of the impact of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on entry in the export market and technology 
upgrading,  I include in  the regressions 2-digit-SIC-industry dummies that absorb part of the 
correlation between changes in tariffs and industry characteristics. After including 2-digit-SIC-
industry dummies the correlation between capital intensity and tariffs falls to -0.06, although the 
correlation between tariffs and skill intensity increases  to 0.06. Thus, in addition to including 2-




B.  Firm-Level Data 
The data I analyze comes from the Encuesta Nacional de Innovación y Conducta Tecnológica de 
las Empresas Argentinas (ENIT) [National Survey on Innovation and Technological Behavior of 
Industrial  Argentinean  Firms]  conducted  by  the  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadística  y  Censos 
(INDEC), the Argentinean government statistical agency. The survey covers the period 1992-
1996 and was conducted in 1997 over a sample of 1,639 industrial firms.  
                                                 
24 I use measures of average capital and skill intensity in the industry in the U.S. in the 1980’s obtained from the 
NBER productivity database (see Appendix D for details). 
25 I use the elasticity of substitution in the industry as estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006). The correlation of 
the elasticity of demand with tariffs is low: 0.05 and 0.06 with controls for 2-digit-SIC-industry dummies.     26 
The  sample  is  representative  of  firms  owning  establishments  with  more  than  10 
employees, and is based on 1993 census data. Although according to the census only 15% of 
establishments had more than 10 employees, they represented 90,7% of the value of output,  
90,9% of industrial value added,  87,9% of employment and 94,1% of the wage bill.
26   
As the survey was conducted in 1997, it does not contain information on firms that were 
active in 1992 and exited afterwards. I focus my analysis on a balanced panel of 1,380 firms 
present both in 1992 and 1996 for which there is information on sales, employment and belong 
to 4-digit-SIC industries with information on Brazil’s tariffs.  
The  survey  contains  information  on  several  dimensions  of  spending  on  technology 
upgrading. Firms upgrade technology by performing various innovation activities like internal 
R&D, paying for technology transfers and buying capital goods that embody new technologies; 
and with different purposes like changing production processes, products, organizational forms 
or commercialization.   I constructed a measure of spending on technology (ST) that includes the 
following: spending on computers and software; payments for technology transfers and patents; 
and spending on equipment, materials and labor related to innovation activities performed within 
the firm.
27  
The  survey  contains  information  on  ST  for  all  years  in  the  period  1992-1996,  while 
information on all the rest of the variables (sales, exports, imports, employment by education, 
investment) is only available for the years 1992 and 1996.   
The survey also contains some binary measures of technology adoption: a list of  9 yes/ 
no questions asking whether the firm performed a certain category of innovation or improvement 
                                                 
26 The sample is the same as the one used for the Encuesta Industrial Annual, the standard yearly industry survey 
used to compute Industrial GDP. A description of the sampling methodology of Encuesta Industrial Annual is 
available at INDEC’s website: www.indec.mecon.ar.  
27 Like R&D, adaptation of new products or production processes, technical assistance for production, engineering 
and industrial design, organization and commercialization.   27 
in products or production process during the period 1992-1996. As an example, one of these 
categories is: “product differentiation”  and another “machinery and equipment associated to new 
production process”. I use this information to construct an innovation index equal to the fraction 
of categories for which the firm gave positive answers.  A detailed description of the questions is 
contained in Appendix D. 
The main measure of technology I use in the empirical analysis is technology spending 
while  the  binary  measures  of  technology  are  used  to  perform  robustness  checks.  I  think 
technology spending is a better measure of technology for two reasons. First, the information has 
a panel structure that can be used to control for unobserved firm and industry characteristics. 
Second,  it is a more objective measure in the sense that it does not depend on the interpretation 
of what an improvement or innovation is.   
Finally,  another  unusual  feature  of  the  survey  is  that  it  contains  information  on 
employment  by  education.    I  use  this  information  to  construct  measures  of  employment  in 
primary school equivalents, skill intensity and sales per worker as described in Appendix D.  
Table  D.1  in  Appendix  D  contains  summary  statistics  by  export  status  for  the  main 
variables of interest for the initial year in the data, 1992.  
 
C.  Industry-Level Data 
 In the  empirical section  I use  controls for 4-digit-SIC industry characteristics that might be 
correlated with changes in tariffs. First, average capital and skill intensity in the industry in the 
U.S.  in  the  1980’s  obtained  from  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research  (NBER) 
productivity database (see Appendix D for details).  I also use the elasticity of substitution in the 
industry as estimated by Christian Broda and David Weinstein (2006). Finally, data on exports   28 
from Brazil to Argentina in the years 1992 and 1996 were obtained from the U.N. COMTRADE 
database. This information is aggregated at the 4-digit-SIC industry. 
 
III. Empirics  
In this section I test the predictions of the theoretical model developed in section I.  First, I check 
whether the sorting pattern of firms into exporting and technology use predicted by the model is 
consistent with the observed characteristics of exporters and non-exporters in the same 4-digit-
SIC industry.   Second, I test the main predictions of the model: that a reduction in variable trade 
costs causes entry in the export market and technology upgrading. To establish causality, I use 
the differential changes in Brazilian tariffs across 4-digit-SIC industries to show that firms are 
more likely to enter the export market and upgrade technology in industries where tariffs fell 
more.   
 
A.  Within-Industry Patterns in the Data  
In the model, underlying productivity differences produce a sorting of firms into three groups: 
the  low  productivity  firms  only  serve  the  domestic  market  and  use  the  low  technology,  the 
medium productivity firms still use the low technology but also export, and the most productive 
firms both export and use the high technology. In this setting a reduction in variable trade costs 
increases exporting revenues inducing firms in the middle-range of the productivity distribution 
to enter the export market and upgrade technology.  
Figure  2  illustrates  the  effects  of  trade  liberalization  for  firms  in  each  part  of  the 
productivity  distribution.    The  upper  line  represents  productivity  cutoffs  to  adopt  the  high 




0 j ), while the lower line   29 




1 j ).  Within the group of firms that were already 
exporting  before liberalization (
x
0 j < j ) those in the upper range of productivity (
h
0 j < j )  were 
already  using  technology  h,  while  firms  in  the  range 
h x
0 0 j j j < <  adopt  it  only  afterwards.  
Within the group of firms that enter the export market after liberalization (
x x
0 1 j j j < < ), those in 
the upper range  (
x h
0 1 j j j < < ) enter the export market and adopt the new technology, while 
those in the lower range (
h x
1 1 j j j < < ) enter the export market but keep the old technology.  
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To check whether the sorting pattern depicted in Figure 2 and the parameter restrictions 
required to obtain it are consistent with the data I divide firms into three groups: continuing   30 
exporters,
28 new exporters,
29 and never exporters
30 and compute differences in characteristics for 
firms operating within the same 4-digit-SIC industry.  
Table 2 reports that, on average, continuing exporters have a 0.37 log points higher level 
of spending in technology per worker a than never exporters in 1992. This is consistent with at 
least a fraction of them already using the high technology before liberalization. Interestingly, 
they  increase  spending  in  technology  0.27  log  points  faster  than  never  exporters  during  the 
liberalization period (1992-1996), which is consistent with a fraction of them adopting the high 
technology after liberalization.  
Firms that would enter the export market after liberalization were not significantly more 
technology intensive than never exporters in 1992  (Table 2). In contrast, after liberalization 
these new exporters become more technology-intensive than firms that do not export, increasing 
their spending in technology per worker 0.34 log points faster between 1992 and 1996.  
The patterns in the data described above show that there is a coincidence between entry 
in the export market and technology upgrading, but can’t establish whether it is expanded export 
opportunities that cause technology adoption, vice versa, or whether both are caused by a third 
factor. Some alternative explanations for the results in Table 2 can be ruled out: as these are 
based  on  comparisons  of  exporters  and  non  exporters  within  industries,  they  are  robust  to 
macroeconomic  shocks  that  affect  all  firms  equally  (an  example  could  be  exchange  rate 
appreciation) or to shocks that affect all firms within an industry (an example could be fast 
technological change in a particular industry). Still, the fact that within each sector exporters and 
new exporters are upgrading technology faster than other firms could reflect other shocks that 
affect middle and high productivity firms differentially. This is particularly plausible in a context 
                                                 
28 Firms that were already exporting in 1992.  
29 Firms that export in 1996 but were not exporting in 1992.  
30 Firms that do not export in 1992 nor 1996.   31 
where  several  reforms  were  implemented  at  the  same  time.    For  example,  capital  account 
liberalization, that could facilitate access to credit to finance technology upgrading and entry in 
foreign  markets  to  medium  and  big  firms  but  not  to  small  firms  in  the  presence  of  credit 
constraints. Then, the next step in the empirical analysis attempts to establish causality by linking 
exporting and technology adoption directly to the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs for imports from 
Argentina. 
 
B.  The Impact of the Reduction in Brazil’s Tariffs:  Identification Strategy 
The empirical identification of the effect of the fall in variable export costs on entry in the export 
market and technology upgrading by Argentinean firms is based on the differential reductions in 
Brazilian tariffs for imports from Argentina across 4-digit-SIC industries. 
This source of identification has two features that make it likely to be exogenous with 
respect  to  the  outcomes  analyzed,  changes  in  export  status  and  changes  in  spending  in 
technology between 1992 and 1996. First, the tariff reductions were programmed in 1991, and 
reach a level of zero for all industries
31 in 1995. Thus changes in tariffs are predetermined by the 
1991 m.f.n tariff levels in Brazil. Second, the 1991 m.f.n import tariffs of Brazil are the same for 
Argentina  and  the  rest  of  the  world  and  are  therefore  unlikely  to  be  targeted  to  industry 
characteristics  particular  to  Argentina,  whose  share  of  Brazil’s  trade  was  only  7.7%.
32   As 
changes in tariffs are predetermined, they are unlikely to be driven by political pressures arising 
from  the  effects  of  liberalization  in  Brazil  or  Argentina,  or  by  contemporaneous  shocks  to 
industrial performance.  As they respond to Brazil’s worldwide trade policy, it is also unlikely 
                                                 
31 Except for the automobile and sugar industries. In the results presented in this section, 1996 tariffs are still set to 
zero for these two industries, to avoid endogeneity problems in using the actual 1996 tariffs.  As a robustness check, 
all the results presented in this section have been replicated for the sample of firms excluding these sectors.  
32 Argentina’s share on Brazil’s imports rose to 11.2% in 1995 when all tariffs were eliminated.   32 
that results are driven by Brazilian tariffs being initially high in industries where Argentina has a 
comparative advantage.  
Although the points above address the reverse causality problem, Brazil’s initial tariff 
structure is certainly not random. As discussed above, Brazil’s trade policy is correlated with  
some industry characteristics, and omitting them could be an important source of bias. Thus, I 
estimate  all  the  equations  in  first  differences,  so  that  constant  industry  characteristics  are 
differenced-out. Still, if industries with different initial characteristics are on different trends, 
Brazil’s tariffs could be capturing some omitted industry-level -time-varying variable. I address 
this  problem  in  two  ways.  First,  I  include  in  the  differenced  equations  2-digit-SIC-industry 
dummies that account for unobserved industry trends at broad sector levels like “Manufacture of 
food products and beverages” (SIC 15) or “Manufacture of chemicals” (SIC 24).  As tariffs vary 
at the 4-digit-level this means that I am comparing manufacturers of dairy products (SIC 1520) 
to macaroni producers (SIC 1544), but not to manufacturers of pharmaceuticals (SIC 2423) that 
are  instead  compared  to  producers  of  fertilizers  (SIC  2412).      Second,  as  there  can  still  be 
important differences between producers of pharmaceuticals and of fertilizers, I include 4-digit-
SIC-level controls for the industry characteristics that are likely to determine tariffs: the elasticity 
of demand, capital and skill intensity. These industry characteristics are measured with U.S. data 
to avoid endogeneity problems. 
An  additional  issue  concerning  the  use  of  Brazil’s  tariffs  to  measure  the  effect  of 
expanded export opportunities on entry in the export market and technology upgrading is that 
they might be correlated with changes in Argentina’s tariffs during this period, as long as the 
structure of protection was similar between the two countries in 1992. To address this concern I 
control for the change in Argentina’s tariffs with respect to the world in the period 1992-1996,   33 
and alternatively for the change in Argentina’s tariffs with respect to Brazil.
33 I control both for 
final goods tariffs and intermediate inputs tariffs. 
 
Heterogeneous Effects 
The sorting pattern of firms described in Figure 2 implies that the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs 
should induce entry in the export market and technology upgrading for firms in the middle range 
of the productivity distribution.  In particular, the model predicts that the reduction in tariffs 
would induce firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution to enter the export market, 
but should not affect firms in the lower  and upper ranges of the distribution. Similarly, the 
reduction in tariffs should only induce firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution 
to upgrade technology.  To study these heterogeneous effects, I use firm size relative to the 4-
digit-SIC industry mean in 1992  as a proxy for initial productivity and divide firms into quartiles.  
Then, I analyze the effects of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on each quartile of the firm size 
distribution.  
Next I present the estimation of the effect tariff changes on entry in the export market and 
later the estimation for technology upgrading.  
 
 C. Entry in the Export Market 
I estimate a linearized version of the entry in the export market choice described by equation (7). 
This linearization does not respect functional form thus estimation only attempts to recover the 
signs of the partial derivative of interest and to assess the economic significance of the estimated 
coefficients. To simplify the exposition, I first describe estimation of the average effect of a 
                                                 
33 An important point to note is that as Argentina’s m.f.n tariffs with the rest of the world in 1992 were the basis for 
MERCOSUR tariff reductions, it is hard to distinguish the effect of the reduction of tariffs with respect to Brazil 
from changes of tariffs with respect to the rest of the world.     34 
reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on entry in the export market for all firms,  and later analyze how this 
effect varies for firms in different quartiles of the size distribution.  
I empirically analyze the entry in the export market decision using an index model:   
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where j indexes 4-digit-SIC industries; s indexes 2-digit-SIC industries; t indexes time, that is the 
years 1992 and 1996; i indexes firms; EXPisjt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm exported in year t; 
x
jt t are Brazil’s tariffs that vary across 4-digit-SIC industries and time;  i 
are plant fixed effects that capture unobserved constant plant heterogeneity (j), constant sector 
characteristics that affect the sector exporting cutoffs in the model (s, k, fx, f, fe) and also some 
other sector characteristics that although not included in the model might affect the exporting 
cutoffs  (like  factor  intensity);
 34 αst  are  2-digit-SIC  industry  dummies  that  capture  variation 
across time in sector characteristics.  
Equation (10) with plant fixed effects can’t be consistently estimated by probit (incidental 
parameters problem). Then I estimate it using the linear probability model:   
ijst i st
x
jt ijst x EXP e m a t b
t + + + =                                                                                            
In this case, first differencing eliminates time-invariant plant and sector heterogeneity: 
(11)     ijs s
x
j ijs x EXP e a t b
t D + D + D = D                                                                                         
Estimation of equation (11) by OLS is reported in the first column of Panel A of Table 3, where 
the reported standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level. The coefficient in the 
change in Brazil’s tariffs ( x t b ) is negative (-0.421) and significant (t = -5.01). The estimated 
                                                 
34 Bernard,  Redding  and  Schott  (2007)  develop  a  two  factor,  two  sector  and  two  country  model  of  trade  with 
heterogeneous firms and show that the cutoff for entry in the export market is closer to the exit cutoff in comparative 
advantage industries.    35 
coefficient implies that the average reduction in Brazil’s tariffs (24 percentage points) increases 
the probability of entry in the export market by 10 percentage points. Columns 2 to 8 assess the 
robustness of the baseline results to inclusion of controls, as described by the following equation: 




j ijs c z EXP m x e a b b t b t b
t t D + D + + + D + D = D 1992    
where 
m
j t D  denotes changes in Argentina’s import tariffs for outputs and inputs w.r.t. the world 
and Brazil; zij1992 are  firm characteristics in the initial  year  (1992) like size measured by the 
number  of  workers,  sales  per  worker  and  skill  intensity;  and  cj  are  4-digit-SIC  industry 
characteristics like the elasticity of demand, skill and capital intensity in the U.S. Estimation of 
equation (12) is reported in columns (2) to (8) of Table 3, and although some of the firm and 
industry  characteristics  are  highly  significant,  the  coefficient  on  Brazil’s  tariffs  is  not 
significantly affected by their inclusion. The coefficients in the regressions including all controls 
(columns 5 and 8) are -0.472 (t=-4.87) and -0.533 (t=-3.78) and imply that the average reduction 
in Brazil’s tariffs (24 percentage points) increases the probability of entry in the export market 
by 11 to 12 percentage points.  
A  potential  problem  of  the  specification  in  equation  (12)  is  that  if  there  are  sunk 
exporting costs, current export status might depend on lagged export status,
35 which in turn is 
likely to be negatively correlated with the initial level of Brazil’s tariffs. This problem can’t be 
solved by including lagged export status in the specification in first differences, as in that case  
export  status  in  1992  would  be  both  part  of  the  dependent  variable  and  a  regressor,  thus 
                                                 
35 Mark J. Roberts and James R. Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) find evidence of the existence of 
sunk exporting costs in Colombia and the U.S., respectively.     36 
necessary correlated with the error term.
36 Still, it is possible to estimate the equation in levels, 
including lagged export status as a regressor, as specified in the following equation:  
(13)     1996 1992 1996 ijs s ij
x
j ijs EXP EXP x e a d t b
t + + + D =                                                                          
Unlike  the  first-differenced  specification,  eq.  (13)  does  not  control  for  unobserved  constant 
heterogeneity. Still, estimation of equation (13) is useful because first-difference and lagged-
dependent-variable estimates have a bracketing property: if the first-difference specification in 
(12)  is  correct,  then  (13)  will  tend  to  underestimate  the  absolute  value  of  x t b ,  while  if  the 
lagged-dependent-variable specification in (13) is correct, then (12) will tend to overestimate the 
absolute value  x t b . This is because the initial level of Brazil’s tariffs is negatively correlated 
with export status in 1992.
37 Panel B of Table 3 reports estimation of equation (13) where the 
estimated coefficient goes from -0.291 (t=4.09) in the baseline specification in Column 1 to 
0.533 (t=3.78) in Column 9 where all controls are included. These estimates are 30% to 8% 
lower than the estimates in the first-differences specification, as expected. They are also less 
stable, possibly due to the omission of unobserved-time-invariant industry characteristics. 
As a final check that the presence of sunk export costs are not creating a problem in the 
identification on the coefficient on Brazil’s tariffs I estimate equation (13) restricted to firms that 
were not exporters in 1992.  Panel C of Table 3 reports the estimation of equation (13) by OLS. 
The coefficient on the change in Brazil’s tariffs is very similar to the one estimated in the first-
difference specification and significant [-0.446 (t=-3.20) and -0.605 (t=-2.99) in columns 5 and 8 
                                                 
36 An alternative solution to this problem that permits to control both for unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
lagged dependent variables is to run a specification in first differences and use further lags of the dependent variable 
as instruments, as proposed by Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond (1991).  I can’t implement this solution because 
the panel I analyze only contains data for 1992 and 1996. 
37 For a discussion and a derivation of the biases in the first-difference and lagged-dependent-variable estimators see 
pages 243-247 in Joshua D. Angrist and Jorn-Steffen Pischke (2008).    37 
where  all  controls  are  included],  implying  that  the  average  reduction  in  tariffs  increases  the 
probability of entering the export market by  11 to 14.5 percentage points.
38  
A potential problem in the estimation of equation (13) restricted to non-exporters in 1992  
is sample selection. The model predicts that in sectors where tariffs are higher the exporting 
cutoff is higher, thus it is likely that in sectors with high initial tariffs non exporters are more 
productive than in sectors with low initial tariffs, creating a positive correlation between Brazil’s 
tariffs  in  1992  and  unobserved  productivity,  thus  biasing  downwards  the  coefficient  on  the 
change in tariffs. A simple way to asses whether this is a problem is to look at the correlation of 
tariffs with firm characteristics that are correlated with unobserved  productivity like size and 
sales per worker in the sub sample of non exporters in 1992, and both are very low (-0.033 and  
0.013). In addition, when these firm characteristics are included in the regressions the coefficient 
does not change (see Panel C , columns 1 and 2 ), thus sample selection does not seem to play an 
important role. 
Entry in the Export Market by Quartile of the Firm Size Distribution 
The model predicts that the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs induces entry in the export market for 
firms in the middle range of the productivity distribution, but not for the least productive firms 
nor the most productive firms who would export even in the presence of  high tariffs. More 
precisely, the prediction is that  the reduction in tariffs induces entry for firms who were below 
the exporting threshold before liberalization, but above it afterwards. That is, those firms with 
productivity in the range 
x x
0 1 j j j < <  in Figure 2.  To test this prediction, I estimate the effect of 
                                                 
38 Equation (13) can also be estimated by Probit as it  does not contain firm fixed-effects. Probit estimation for both 
the full sample and  the sample of non- exporters in 1992 produces very similar results as OLS, Tables reporting this 
estimations are available upon request.    38 
the change in Brazil’s tariffs on each quartile of the initial firm size distribution
39 through the 
following equation: 
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 where r indexes each of the four quartiles of the size distribution and 
r
ij Q  are dummy variables 
taking the value of 1 when firm i belongs to quartile r. Estimation results are presented in column 
1 Table 4. The effect of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on the probability to enter the export 
market is around 2 times larger in the 3
rd  quartile of the firm size distribution, where the point 
estimate is -0.735 (t= 4.45).  Columns 4 presents estimation of the equation in levels including  
lagged export status as a control.  The point estimates of 
r
x t b  are smaller, but the same pattern is 
observed: the estimate of 
r
x t b  is largest in the 3
rd 
 quartile and precisely estimated (
3
x t b =-0.535, 
t= -3.56). Column 7 reports estimation of 
r
x t b  in the sample of firms that were not exporters in 
1992, with similar results as in the full sample (
3
x t b =-0.785, t= -3.31).  
The effect of the reduction in tariffs on the rest of the quartiles is less precisely estimated. 
The coefficients are negative but not always statistically significant.  Taken altogether the results 





  and 4
th quartiles were induced to enter the export market 
by the reduction  in Brazil’s tariffs.  This is not inconsistent with the model,  as size is not a 
perfect measure of productivity and the exporting cutoffs might differ across industries.  
                                                 
39 As  a  proxy  for  initial  productivity,  I  use  initial  firm  size  in  terms  of  (log)  employment  in  primary  school 
equivalents relative to the 4-digit-industry average, as detailed in Appendix D. Alternatively I used (log) domestic 
sales relative to the 4-digit-industry mean as a proxy for initial productivity, with similar but less precise results than 
the ones reported below. I prefer the employment measure because it reflects value-added better than sales, as long 
as there are differences in the level of vertical integration across firms.  
   39 
The point estimates of 
3
x t b  in the baseline specifications (columns 1, 4 and 7) imply that 
the 24 p.p. reduction in Brazil’s tariffs increases the probability to enter the export market by 18 
to 13 p.p. for firms in the 3
rd  quartile of the size distribution. The finding that the reduction in 
Brazil’s tariffs had a smaller impact on entry for firms in the top quartile of the size distribution 
suggests that most of them were above the threshold before (or regardless of)  liberalization. 
Similarly, the lower induced entry for firms in the first and second quartiles suggests that most of 
them were still below the threshold after liberalization. Thus, trade liberalization induced more 
entry in the export market for firms in the upper-middle range of the size distribution.  
To assess the robustness of the baseline estimates of 
r
x t b  discussed above (Columns 1 , 4 
and 7 of Table 4) I perform a similar series of checks as in the estimation of average industry-
level effects of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs in Table 3.   The remaining columns in Table 4 
show that results are robust to the inclusion of changes in Argentina’s import tariffs (for both 
output  and  inputs  and  w.r.t.  the  world  and  Brazil)  and  industry  characteristics  (capital,  skill 
intensity and elasticity of demand).  
D.  Technology Adoption Decision  
Spending in Technology 
The technology adoption decision described in the model (equation 8) is binary. In the data, I 
observe  a  continuous  measure  of  spending  in  technology  and  also  some  binary  measures  of 
product and process innovation. The technology spending measure has the advantage of having a 
panel structure that can be used to control for unobserved firm and industry characteristics but 
the disadvantage that only a sub-sample of firms has positive ST in 1992 and 1996. This sample 
is not representative for the smallest firms, while the binary measures of technology contained in   40 
the survey are available for a representative sample.  I first analyze the ST measure and later I 
also discuss the binary innovation measures.  
I  first  describe  estimation  of  the  average  effect  of  a  reduction  in  Brazil’s  tariffs  on 
spending  in  technology  for  all  firms,    and  later  analyze  how  this  effect  varies  for  firms  in 
different quartiles of the size distribution. In the model, a firm is more likely to adopt technology 
h the lower is the technology adoption threshold (
h j ) in its sector [equation (8)], and the higher 
is its own productivity (j ). Then the level of spending in technology can be described by:  




jt ijst m x ST e m a t b t b
t t + + + + = log  
where t
m denotes Argentina’s import tariffs, as adoption of new technologies depends on both 
export and domestic revenues.  As the survey has information on ST for all the years in the 
period 1992-1996, equation (15) could be estimated in levels using the data for all the available 
years. The problem with this estimation strategy is that it would induce serial correlation in the 
error terms, as the variation across time in Brazil’s tariffs is fully determined by their level in 
1992. As a result, the  standard error of the estimated coefficients would understate their standard 
deviation, as noted by Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). Thus, 
instead of estimating equation (15) in levels for all the available years, I implement one their 
proposed  solutions.    I  collapse  the  data  in  two  periods,  one  before  (1992)  and  one  after 
liberalization  (1993-1996)  and  take  first  differences.
40   I  thus  estimate  equation  (15)  in  first 
differences: 




j ijs m x ST e a t b t b
t t D + D + D + D = Dlog      
                                                 
40 An alternative would be to only use the information in 1992 and 1996. I chose the first option to exploit all the 
available information, and also to minimize the number of observations with zero ST.  The first alternative gives 
very similar results, although the standard errors are slightly bigger.   41 
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 Estimation of equation (16) by OLS is reported in Table 5. The coefficient on the change 
in Brazil’s tariffs is negative and significant in all specifications. The estimated coefficient in the 
baseline specification in column 1, where only the change in Brazil’s tariffs is included as a 
regressor    is  -1.079  (t=3.08)  and    implies  that  the  average  reduction  in  Brazil’s  tariffs  (24 
percentage points) induces an increase in technology spending of 0.24 log points. The estimated 
coefficient is not affected by the inclusion of firm-level controls (Column 2 ) nor by the change 
in Argentina’s output and input tariffs with respect to the world (Columns 3 to 5). Instead, the 
inclusion of  the change in Argentina’s output tariffs with respect to Brazil (Column 6)  increases 
the coefficient to -1.436 (t=-3.21), possibly because these are correlated with Brazil’s tariffs but 
had an effect of the opposite sign in technology adoption, although not statistically significant. 
Finally, the inclusion of the change in Argentina’s input tariffs with respect to Brazil (Column 7) 
does not affect the estimated coefficient.  
A  further  question  is  whether  the  reduction  in  Brazil’s  tariffs  also  increases  the 
technology intensity of production, in the sense of increasing the ratio of spending in technology 
to labor. This is stronger evidence that firms are actually changing their production technology, 
instead of just expanding production by increasing the use of all factors proportionally. Table E.1 
in Appendix E reports estimates of equation (16), replacing the growth in spending in technology 
by the growth in spending in technology per worker as the dependent variable. The estimates of 
x t b  are very similar to the ones reported in Table 5.
41  
An important caveat in the interpretation of the results presented in this section is that 
equation (16) can only be estimated on a sub-sample of firms that have positive ST in 1992 and 
                                                 
41 Similar results are also obtained when the outcome variable is the ratio of spending in technology to sales.    42 
1993-1996, 894 out of the total of 1380 firms in the panel.   Firms reporting a positive level of 
spending in technology tend to be bigger: only 14% of them belong to the first size quartile, 
while 33% belong to the fourth, as reported in Table D.2 in Appendix D. Thus, results might not 
be representative for the smallest firms. Instead, the binary measures of technology that I use to 
construct the innovation indexes are available for a larger sub-sample of firms (1310 firms) that 
is representative in terms of size, as around 25% of firms in the sub-sample belong to each size 
quartile.  
 
Binary Measures of Technology 
In  this  section  I  analyze  alternative  measures  of  technology.  I  use  a  set  of  questions  on 
improvements  in  products  and  production  process  to  construct  indexes  for  the  fraction  of 
questions in each category and overall that were answered positively by the firm.  
Table 6 reports OLS estimates of equation (16), replacing the change in spending in 
technology by indexes of innovation as a dependent variable. The coefficient on the change in 
Brazil’s tariffs is negative and significant for all and each type of innovation. Consistent with the 
results presented in the previous section, the estimated coefficient is sensitive to the inclusion of 
the change in Argentina’s tariffs with respect to Brazil as a control, changing from -0.30 (t=3.35) 
to -0.40 (t=3.42) (columns 2 and 3). It is possible that this is due to the reduction in Argentina’s 
output tariffs having an effect of innovation of the opposite sign, although the estimate is only 
marginally  significant  (Column  3).  The  estimated  coefficient  in  column  2  implies  that  the 
average reduction in Brazil’s tariffs induces an increase of 0.07 in the innovations index, which 
is 19% of the average innovation index (0.38).   As the index is constructed as the fraction of 
yes/no questions about product and process innovation to which the firm gave a positive answer,   43 
the  result  can  be  interpreted  as  19%  increase  in  the  fraction  of  questions  about  innovation 
answered  positively  by  the  firm.    The  effect  of  a  reduction  in  Brazil’s  tariffs  is  of  similar 
magnitude when the innovation index is disaggregated in product and process innovations.  
Technology Adoption by Quartile of the Firm Size Distribution 
The model predicts that the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs induces technology adoption for firms in 
the middle range of the productivity distribution, but not for the least productive firms who do 
not  export  nor  the  most  productive  firms  who  already  adopted  the  high  technology.  More 
precisely, the prediction is that  the reduction in tariffs induces technology upgrading for firms 
who were below the technology adoption threshold before liberalization, but above afterwards. 
That  is,  those  firms  with  productivity  in  the  range 
h h
0 1 j j j < <  in  Figure  2.    To  test  this 
prediction, I estimate the effect of the change in Brazil’s tariffs on each quartile of the initial firm 
size distribution
42 through the following equation: 
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 where r indexes each of the four quartiles of the size distribution and 
r
ij Q  are dummy variables 
taking the value of 1 when firm i belongs to quartile r. Estimation results are presented in Table 
7 for both spending in technology and the innovation index. The reduction in tariffs induces a 
statistically significant increase in spending in technology only in the third quartile of the size 
distribution, where the estimated coefficient  is -2.184 (t=3.57) (column 1). The point estimate is 
double the size than the estimated average effect for all firms reported in Table 5, and more than 
double the estimated coefficient for the other three quartiles of the size distribution.  The results 
                                                 
42 As noted above, I use initial firm size in terms of (log) employment in efficiency units relative to the 4-digit-
industry average as a proxy for initial productivity. Alternatively I used (log) domestic sales relative to the 4-digit-
industry mean as a proxy for initial productivity, with similar but less precise results than the ones reported below.  
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on the innovation index parallel the findings with the ST measure: the reduction in tariffs induces 
a statistically significant increase in innovation only in the third quartile of the size distribution, 
where the point estimate of 
r
x t b  is -0.385 (t=2.92), as reported in column 4.  
The effect of the reduction in tariffs on the rest of the quartiles is less precisely estimated. The 






  and 4
th quartiles were induced to upgrade technology by the reduction  in Brazil’s tariffs.  
As mentioned above, this is not inconsistent with the model,  as size is not a perfect measure of 
productivity and the technology adoption cutoffs might differ across industries.  
The point estimate of 
3
x t b  implies that the 24 p.p.  reduction in Brazil’s tariffs induces firms in 
the third quartile of the size distribution to increase their spending in technology an average of 
0.52 log points. The finding that firms in the top quartile of the size distribution did not increase 
ST in response to the reduction in tariffs suggests that they were above the threshold before, or 
regardless of,   liberalization. Similarly, the lower and not statistically  significant increase in 
spending in technology for firms in the second quartile suggests that they were still below the 
threshold after liberalization. Thus, trade liberalization induced technology upgrading for firms 
in the upper-middle range of the size distribution.  
To assess the robustness of the baseline estimates of 
r
x t b  discussed above (Columns 1 and 4 
of Table 7) I perform a similar series of checks as in the estimation of average industry-level 
effects of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs in Tables 5 and 6.  Columns 1-6 in Table 7 show that 
results are robust to the inclusion of changes in Argentina’s import tariffs (for both output and   45 
inputs and w.r.t. the world and Brazil)  and industry characteristics (capital, skill intensity and 
elasticity of demand).
43 
To assess whether firms increased the technology intensity of production, I  estimate eq. 17 
replacing the outcome of interest by spending in technology per worker.  The results parallel the 
findings with the ST measure: the reduction in tariffs induces a statistically significant increase 
in spending in technology only in the third quartile of the size distribution, where the estimated 
coefficient  is -2.124 (t=3.76) (column 1, Table E.2 in Appendix E).  
Finally, to assess whether the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs affected both product and process 
innovation, I estimate equation 17 separately for each type  of innovation index. I obtain similar 
results as the ones reported above with the aggregate index, as reported in Columns 4-9 of  Table 
E.2 in Appendix E.  
 
E.  Mechanism 
In this section I discuss how the evidence presented above relates to the mechanism emphasized 
in the theoretical model, namely that trade liberalization generates an increase in revenues for 
exporters making it profitable for them to adopt the high technology. Finally, I provide evidence 
that  the  reduction  in  Brazil’s  tariffs  increased  export  sales  to  Brazil,  and  the  reduction  in 
Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil reduced domestic sales.  
 
 
                                                 
43 As a further robustness check, interactions between changes in Argentina’s import tariffs and firm size quartiles 
were included as controls in the estimation of equation 17. Alternatively, a set of interactions between industry 
characteristics and firm size quartile dummies were also included as controls. The estimated coefficient of the effect 
of Brazil’s tariffs on ST and innovation in the 3
rd quartile of the firm size distribution is  not affected by the 
inclusion of these controls, and is always significant at 1% confidence level. Tables reporting these estimations are 
available upon request.  
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Technology Upgrading by Export Status 
The finding that the reduction in tariffs induces an increase in Spending in Technology on the 3
rd 
quartile of the firm size distribution is consistent with the theoretical prediction that only firms 
who are induced to cross a size threshold by the increase in export sales upgrade technology. To 
explore this issue further, I split the sample of firms in two on the basis of initial export status 
and show that the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs induced technology upgrading in both sub-samples. 
This implies that firms that were already exporting in 1992 are induced to upgrade technology by 
the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs, which is consistent with technology upgrading being driven by 
the  increase  in  revenues.  If  technology  upgrading  was  driven  by  the  mere  act  of  exporting, 
Brazil’s tariffs would impact technology spending only through their induced entry in the export 
market.   
I estimate the effect of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on  ST and the innovation indices 
for two sub-samples of firms, the ones that did not export in 1992 and the ones that did.  The 
model  predicts  that  both  groups  upgrade  technology  if  the  ordering  of  cutoffs  is 
h x h x
0 0 1 1 j j j j < < < , as depicted in Figure 2.  Estimation results when the outcome of interest is 
ST are reported in Table 8, where Panel A reports the estimation the sub-sample of firms that did 
not  export  in  1992  and  Panel  B  for  the  sub-sample  of  firms  that  exported  in  1992.    The 
coefficient  is  similar  to  the  one  estimated  for  the  full  sample,  and  significant  in  almost  all 
specifications.    These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  within-industry  patterns  in  the  data 
presented  in  Table  2,  namely  that  both  continuing  exporters  and  new  entrants  in  the  export 
market  increase  ST  faster  than  non  exporters  in  the  same  4-digit  industry.  Finally,  Table  9 
reports the  estimation of the impact of Brazil’s tariffs when the outcome of interest  are the  
product and process innovation indexes, with similar results in both sub-samples.    47 
Exports to Brazil 
In this section I report evidence using COMTRADE data on exports from Argentina to Brazil at 
the 4-digit-SIC-industry level of aggregation that has information on export sales by destination. 
The analysis of export sales at the firm-level did not produce consistent results, possibly because 
the data combines all destinations.
44 The main differences between the industry-level and firm-
level data on exports are that industry-level data is reported by destination, reflects the universe 
of exports instead of a sample, and  changes in export sales at the industry level not only capture 
the changes in sales of continuing exporters but also of new exporters.  
Table 10 reports estimation results of the effect of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on (log) 
exports to Brazil. As the number of observations is smaller than with the firm-level data, I try to 
assess the robustness of the estimates by reporting results with and without 2-digit-SIC industry 
dummies, and report both O.L.S. and I.V estimates. The I.V. estimates use Brazil’s tariffs in 
1991 to instrument for Brazil’s tariffs in 1992 in an attempt to correct for measurement error in 
Brazil’s tariffs. As industry-level tariffs are computed as averages of  product-level tariffs,  zero 
or small trade in some products in a given year can produce inaccurate measures of industry-
level tariffs. Panel A reports O.L.S estimates. The point estimate of the effect of Brazil’s tariffs 
on exports is negative, and  statistically significant in all columns except in column 3 where 
controls for changes in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t Brazil and 2-digit-SIC industry dummies are 
included  in  the  regression.  Panel  B  reports  I.V.  estimates,  where  both  the  magnitude  of  the 
coefficient increases and standard errors fall, suggesting that measurement error in tariffs might 
                                                 
44 The estimated coefficients for the impact of the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs on the change in (log) export sales at 
the firm-level are not significant nor robust, in the sense that the point estimates vary between 1.429 and 0.16 
depending on the combination of controls. In addition, they have the wrong sign. To check whether this instability is 
due to the fact that the distribution of the dependent variable is very disperse, I dropped the observations in the top 
and bottom deciles.  The coefficients become all negative and  stable between  -0.471 and -0.252 but still not 
statistically significant.   48 
produce attenuation bias in the O.L.S. results. Finally, Panel C reports the first stage of the I.V. 
estimates. 
  Overall, the industry-level data estimates suggest that the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs 
had a sizable impact on export sales: the 0.24 p.p. reduction in tariffs increased export sales by 
0.68 to 0.84 log points, according to the O.L.S and I.V. baseline estimates reported in column 1, 
where 2-digit-SIC-industry dummies are included.   
Domestic Sales 
 The  model  predicts  that  domestic  sales  decline  with  tariff  declines.  The  mapping  of  this 
prediction to the data is not straightforward, as the model considers a fully symmetric case where 
changes  in  tariffs  are  the  same  for  both  countries.
45 Thus,  the  model  does  not  differentiate 
between Brazil’s and Argentina’s tariffs. The empirical evidence suggests that the reduction in 
Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil reduced domestic sales, while the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs did 
not have a significant effect.  
Table 11 reports estimation of the impact of the reduction in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. 
Brazil on domestic sales. The point estimate in the baseline specification in column 1 is 1.431 
(t=2.61), and implies that the 13 p.p. reduction in Argentina’s tariffs reduced domestic sales by 
0.19  log  points.  The  point  estimate  is  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  controls  for  changes  in 
Argentina’s  input  tariffs  w.r.t.  Brazil  and  industry  characteristics  (Columns  2  and  4),    falls 
slightly to 1.153 (t=2.20) when changes in Brazil’s tariffs are included in the regression (Column 
5) and becomes insignificant when in addition controls for industry or firm characteristics  are 
                                                 
45 The  reason  for  considering  the  symmetric  case  is  to  obtain  a  closed-form  solution  for  the  model  in  general 
equilibrium, that is, allowing for the free entry of firms. This is important, as it highlights that trade liberalization 
has an impact on technology adoption only when not all firms export, as if all firms exported the increased revenues 
produced by tariff reductions would induce entry until revenues fall to their initial level, as indicated in the theory 
section.    49 
included  (Columns  6  and  7).  The  evidence  is  thus  not  conclusive  but  suggestive  that  the 
reduction in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil reduced domestic sales. 
Table 12 reports estimation of the effect of other changes in tariffs on domestic sales. 
Unlike the change in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil, changes in Argentina’s output and input 
tariffs w.r.t. the world did not have a statistically significant effect on domestic sales. This might 
be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  changes  in  Argentina’s  tariffs  w.r.t  the  world  were  smaller,  as 
unilateral trade liberalization took place before 1992. Finally, changes in Brazil’s tariffs w.r.t 
Argentina did not have a statistically significant effect on domestic sales.  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The  evidence  reported  in  this  paper  suggests  that  expanded  export  opportunities  can  have  a 
positive effect on firm performance. The evidence is consistent with falling trading partner’s 
tariffs increasing revenues for exporters and making adoption of new technologies profitable for 
more firms.  The finding that falling trading partner’s tariffs induce firms to take actions that can 
increase their productivity suggests that the cross-sectional differences between exporters and 
non exporters are not completely explained by selection of the most productive firms into the 
export market, but are partly induced by participation in export markets. Therefore, trade policies 
oriented to facilitate access to foreign markets, like multilateral trade liberalizations, can have a 
positive effect on firm-level performance.  
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  Average  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  Industries 
Brazil’s m.f.n. tariffs in 1991      0.29  0.17  0.00  0.84  101 
Brazil’s m.f.n. tariffs in 1992  0.24  0.13  0.00  0.63  104 
 
Argentina’s m.f.n tariffs in 1992           
Outputs  0.13  0.06  0.00  0.22  102 
Inputs  0.11  0.03  0.01  0.17  101 
 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. the world 1992-1996           
Outputs  0.01  0.05  -0.10  0.15  104 
Inputs  0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.06  101 
Note: Industries refer to 4-digit-SIC Industries with available tariff data.  
 
 
Table 2: Differences between exporters and non exporters  
 













Firm Characteristic           
Sales  1.82  1.06  0.18  0.25  1380 
   [0.086]***  [0.099]***  [0.038]***  [0.046]***    
Employment  1.52  0.86  0.02  0.18  1380 
   [0.072]***  [0.084]***  [0.025]  [0.033]***    
Spending in Technology  0.37  0.21  0.27  0.34  894 
per worker  [0.145]**  [0.168]  [0.103]***  [0.116]***    
Skill Intensity  6.49  1.88  1.22  1.27  1380 
   [1.099]***  [1.071]*  [0.374]***  [0.461]***    
Note: Robust Standard Errors in Brackets. * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Exporter premia are estimated from a regression of the form: ln Yij = α1  NEij + α2  EEij + α3 ENij + Ij+ εij  where i 
indexes  firms,  j  indexes  industries  (four  digit  SIC  classification);  NE  are  new  exporters  (231  firms),  EE  are 
continuing exporters (556 firms), EN are firms that exported in 1992  but didn’t in 1996 (27 firms) and the reference 
category relative to which differences are estimated is non exporters (566 firms); I are industry dummies, and Y is the 
firm characteristic for which the differences are estimated. Table 3: Entry in the Export Market 
  (1))  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
 
Panel A:  Full Sample. Dependent variable: change in export status 1996-1992 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -0.421  -0.417  -0.406  -0.342  -0.472  -0.325  -0.362  -0.533 
  [0.084]***  [0.080]***  [0.083]***  [0.108]***  [0.097]***  [0.091]***  [0.093]***  [0.141]*** 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. world      0.172  0.118  -0.091       
Outputs      [0.408]  [0.383]  [0.317]       
        1.108  1.554       
Inputs        [0.880]  [0.689]**       
                 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil                 
Outputs                 
            -0.507  -0.780  -0.269 
Inputs            [0.331]  [0.300]**  [0.344] 
              1.213  0.701 
              [0.599]**  [0.524] 
Firm-level controls    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry-level controls          Yes      Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1380  1380  1380  1348  1348  1374  1342  1342 
R-squared  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05 
 
Panel B:  Full Sample. Dependent variable:  export status in 1996 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -0.291  -0.286  -0.271  -0.199  -0.321  -0.262  -0.281  -0.490 
  [0.071]***  [0.077]***  [0.073]***  [0.084]**  [0.102]***  [0.101]**  [0.111]**  [0.144]*** 
Export status in 1992  0.642  0.543  0.542  0.544  0.546  0.542  0.545  0.544 
  [0.023]***  [0.028]***  [0.028]***  [0.028]***  [0.028]***  [0.028]***  [0.029]***  [0.028]*** 
R-squared  0.46  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Remaining controls and number of observations are the same as in the corresponding column in Panel A 
 
Panel C:  Sample of non exporters in 1992. Dependent variable:  export status in 1996 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -0.411  -0.447  -0.446  -0.288  -0.446  -0.330  -0.357  -0.605 
  [0.108]***  [0.123]***  [0.122]***  [0.125]**  [0.139]***  [0.150]**  [0.175]**  [0.202]*** 
Observations  797  797  797  781  781  797  781  781 
R-squared  0.04  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.16  0.16  0.17 
Controls are the same as in the corresponding column in Panel A 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Firm-level controls 
include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand 
elasticity, skill intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S.  Table 4: Entry in the Export Market by Quartile of the Firm Size Distribution  
  
Dependent variable indicated in columns  
  Full Sample  Sample of non-exporters in 1992  
  Change in Export Status 1996-1992  Export Status in 1996  Export Status in 1996 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs                       
´ First Size Quartile  -0.328  -0.392  -0.438  -0.125  -0.157  -0.290  -0.358  -0.373  -0.435 
  [0.184]*  [0.189]**  [0.198]**  [0.169]  [0.179]  [0.189]  [0.180]**  [0.203]*  [0.224]* 
´ Second Size Quartile  -0.325  -0.372  -0.408  -0.142  -0.166  -0.299  -0.249  -0.250  -0.306 
  [0.147]**  [0.194]*  [0.220]*  [0.175]  [0.211]  [0.229]  [0.233]  [0.261]  [0.281] 
´Third Size Quartile  -0.735  -0.806  -0.848  -0.535  -0.570  -0.696  -0.785  -0.731  -0.798 
  [0.165]***  [0.153]***  [0.201]***  [0.150]***  [0.152]***  [0.195]***  [0.237]***  [0.242]***  [0.283]*** 
´Fourth Size Quartile   -0.346  -0.421  -0.469  -0.290  -0.338  -0.473  -0.317  -0.348  -0.399 
  [0.174]**  [0.177]**  [0.203]**  [0.118]**  [0.144]**  [0.163]***  [0.350]  [0.385]  [0.377] 
Controls                   
Export Status in 1992        0.553  0.558  0.557       
        [0.027]***  [0.027]***  [0.028]***       
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. world    Yes      Yes      Yes   
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil      Yes      Yes      Yes 
Industry-level controls    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Firm-level controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1380  1348  1342  1380  1348  1342  797  781  781 
R-squared  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.15  0.16  0.16 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls for changes in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. the world 
and Brazil include both output and input tariffs. Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S. Firm-level controls include 
dummies for the second, third and fourth quartile of the firm-size distribution in the initial year (1992). Table 5: Technology Adoption 
Dependent variable: change in log (spending in technology)  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -1.079  -1.076  -1.033  -1.063  -0.921  -1.436  -1.435  -1.448 
  [0.350]***  [0.346]***  [0.319]***  [0.334]***  [0.383]**  [0.447]***  [0.483]***  [0.643]** 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. world                 
Outputs      0.635  0.717  0.760       
      [1.073]  [1.099]  [1.153]       
Inputs        -0.863  -0.995       
        [3.229]  [3.031]       
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil                 
Outputs            2.050  2.250  2.534 
            [1.323]  [1.370]  [1.883] 
Inputs              -0.351  -0.728 
              [2.788]  [3.037] 
Firm-level controls    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry-level controls          Yes      Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  894  894  894  872  872  892  870  870 
R-squared  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.06 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Firm-level controls 
include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand 
elasticity, skill intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S.  
 
Table 6: Product and Process Innovation 
Dependent variable indicated in columns  
  Product and Process Innovation   Product Innovation  Production Process Innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -0.236  -0.302  -0.400  -0.293  -0.348  -0.438  -0.183  -0.266  -0.358 
  [0.104]**  [0.090]***  [0.117]***  [0.116]**  [0.098]***  [0.116]***  [0.100]*  [0.094]***  [0.127]*** 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. world                   
Outputs    -0.184      -0.155      -0.238   
    [0.251]      [0.264]      [0.275]   
Inputs    0.261      0.102      0.389   
    [0.619]      [0.740]      [0.572]   
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil                   
Outputs      0.526      0.622      0.336 
      [0.308]*      [0.335]*      [0.326] 
Inputs      -0.254      -0.577      0.196 
      [0.554]      [0.578]      [0.587] 
Industry-level controls    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Firm-level controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1301  1269  1263  1312  1280  1274  1319  1287  1281 
R-squared  0.24  0.25  0.26  0.22  0.24  0.24  0.22  0.23  0.23 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Firm-level controls include employment 
measured in efficiency units, sales per worker and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity and capital 
intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S.  Table 7: Technology Adoption by Quartile of the Firm Size Distribution 
  
Dependent variable indicated in columns    
  Change in Spending in Technology 1996-1992  Product and Process Innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs                 
´ First Size Quartile  -0.888  -0.726  -1.254  -0.037  -0.072  -0.159 
  [0.606]  [0.569]  [0.758]  [0.115]  [0.113]  [0.142] 
´ Second Size Quartile  -0.829  -0.633  -1.155  -0.200  -0.228  -0.326 
  [0.569]  [0.632]  [0.830]  [0.150]  [0.145]  [0.163]** 
´ Third Size Quartile  -2.184  -1.990  -2.505  -0.385  -0.429  -0.491 
  [0.612]***  [0.628]***  [0.887]***  [0.132]***  [0.145]***  [0.168]*** 
´ Fourth Size Quartile   -0.314  -0.079  -0.596  -0.168  -0.206  -0.294 
  [0.545]  [0.566]  [0.781]  [0.127]  [0.129]  [0.152]* 
Controls              
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. World    Yes      Yes   
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil      Yes      Yes 
Industry-level controls    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Firm-level controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  894  872  870  1301  1269  1263 
R-squared  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.20  0.20  0.21 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Controls 
for changes in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. the world and Brazil include both output and input tariffs. Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill 
intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S. Firm-level controls include dummies for the second, third and fourth quartile of the 
firm-size distribution in the initial year (1992). Table 8: Technology Adoption by initial Export Status  
Dependent variable: change in log (spending in technology) 1996-1992 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Panel A: Sample of non-exporters in 1992 
                 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -1.073  -1.255  -1.312  -1.119  -0.992  -1.587  -1.871  -1.788 
  [0.520]**  [0.513]**  [0.494]***  [0.434]**  [0.458]**  [0.682]**  [0.763]**  [0.947]* 
Panel B: Sample of exporters in 1992 
                 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs  -1.116  -1.041  -0.895  -1.105  -0.974  -1.343  -1.012  -1.149 
  [0.382]***  [0.380]***  [0.409]**  [0.404]***  [0.524]*  [0.485]***  [0.555]*  [0.787] 
Controls                 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. world                 
Outputs      Yes  Yes  Yes       
Inputs        Yes  Yes       
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil                 
Outputs            Yes  Yes  Yes 
Inputs              Yes  Yes 
Firm-level controls    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry-level controls          Yes      Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Number of observations in Panel A is 417 
or 407 when  input tariffs are included  as controls.  Number of observations in Panel B is 477 in columns 1 to 3, 465 in columns 4 and 6, 475 in column 6 and 463 in columns 7 and 8. 
Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level controls include demand 
elasticity, skill intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S.  
 
Table 9: Product and Process Innovation by initial  Export Status 
Dependent variable indicated in columns 
  Product and Process Innovation  Product Innovation  Production Process Innovation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Panel A: Sample of non-exporters in 1992                   
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -0.181  -0.290  -0.370  -0.221  -0.326  -0.405  -0.146  -0.265  -0.336 
  [0.118]  [0.100]***  [0.126]***  [0.126]*  [0.112]***  [0.126]***  [0.116]  [0.099]***  [0.138]** 
                   
Panel B: Sample of exporters in 1992  -0.324  -0.321  -0.412  -0.402  -0.378  -0.454  -0.246  -0.273  -0.363 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs  [0.130]**  [0.141]**  [0.184]**  [0.159]**  [0.151]**  [0.204]**  [0.121]**  [0.149]*  [0.181]** 
                   
Controls                   
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. world    Yes      Yes      Yes   
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil      Yes      Yes      Yes 
Firm-level controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry-level controls    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Number of observations in Panel A is 741 
in column 1, 725  columns 2, and 3, 747 in column 4, 731 in columns 5 and 6, 753 in column 7 and 737 in columns 8 and 9. Controls for changes in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. the world 
and Brazil include both output and input tariffs Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units, sales per worker and skill intensity, all measured in the initial year 
(1992). Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S.  Table 10: Export Sales to Brazil  
Dependent variable: change in (log) export sales 1992-1996 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel A: OLS             
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -2.836  -3.587  -2.402  -3.113  -2.654  -2.291 
  [1.560]*  [1.353]***  [1.622]  [1.325]**  [1.214]**  [1.325]* 
R-squared  0.39  0.45  0.45  0.07  0.19  0.17 
Panel B: IV             
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      -3.513  -4.227  -3.129  -3.911  -3.376  -3.242 
  [1.448]**  [1.288]***  [1.411]**  [1.339]***  [1.270]***  [1.341]** 
R-squared  0.39  0.45  0.45  0.07  0.19  0.16 
Panel C: First Stage             
Brazil’s tariffs in 1991  -0.774  -0.761  -0.747  -0.763  -0.765  -0.744 
  [0.035]***  [0.041]***  [0.038]***  [0.026]***  [0.029]***  [0.032]*** 
R-squared  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.94  0.94  0.94 
F-test on excluded instrument   480.12  341.05  378.54  867.07  676.50  548.69 
Controls             
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. world    Yes      Yes   
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil      Yes      Yes 
Industry-level controls    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes       
Observations  100  97  96  100  97  96 
R-squared  0.39  0.45  0.45  0.07  0.19  0.16 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls for changes 
in Argentina’s tariffs w.r.t. the world and Brazil include both output and input tariffs. Industry-level controls include demand elasticity, 
skill intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S. 
 
Table 11: Domestic Sales, Effect of Argentina’s Output Tariff Reductions w.r.t Brazil 
Dependent variable: change in log (domestic sales) 1996-1992 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil               
Outputs  1.431  1.520  1.082  1.421  1.153  0.767  0.893 
  [0.547]**  [0.565]***  [0.527]**  [0.524]***  [0.523]**  [0.550]  [0.649] 
Inputs    -0.598  -0.131  -0.444    -0.634  -0.819 
    [1.508]  [1.349]  [1.251]    [1.246]  [1.196] 
               
Change in Brazil’s tariffs              0.180  0.268  0.351 
          [0.249]  [0.211]  [0.260] 
Firm-level controls      Yes      Yes   
Industry-level controls        Yes      Yes 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1374  1342  1342  1342  1374  1342  1342 
R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.09  0.07 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Firm-level controls include employment measured in efficiency units and skill intensity, both measured in the initial year (1992). Industry-level 
controls include demand elasticity, skill intensity and capital intensity of the 4-digit-SIC industry in the U.S.  
 
 
Table 12: Domestic Sales, Effect of other Tariff Reductions  
Dependent variable: change in log (domestic sales) 1996-1992 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      1.065         
  [1.444]         
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. Brazil           
Inputs    0.382       
    [0.245]       
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. the world           
Outputs      -0.816    -1.078 
      [0.736]    [0.724] 
Inputs        1.799  2.150 
        [1.484]  [1.591] 
2-digit-SIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1348  1380  1380  1348  1348 
R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-SIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 